On Being Some-One

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What is the difference between the things that I do, like walk across a room and pick up a newspaper, and things that my body does, like regulate the flow of blood and marshal white blood cells to the scene of injury? Or what is the difference between a wink or a blink, or diving and falling? The first of each of these pairs is something that I choose and initiate. The second is something over which I have no control. That is about as straightforward a thought as can be. But what is this I that is doing the choosing and that is thought to be the source of action. Where is it located?

If we want to appeal to the role of the self to draw the distinction between action and mere behaviour, we need a literal interpretation of that talk that meshes with what our neuroscience teaches us about what is actually going on in the brain. But it has become popular among some who study the mind scientifically, to dismiss the idea of the self as an illusion, an understandable, but immature idea to be swept aside with the advancing understanding of the brain. Dennett, Metzinger, Gazzaniga, and others draw what they see as the natural conclusion from the neuroscientific examination of the brain, viz., that there is no self.

The claim is that the idea of the self as the thing that controls my behaviour when I act has no application at the level of neuroscience. Looking at the brain through the neuroscientist’s eyes we see neurons sending signals to other neurons. We can make some topological and functional divisions, but there doesn’t seem to be a fused locus of control where the threads come together and from which action issues. The neuroscientist looking in the brain for the self finds himself in the position that Dennett describes jokingly here:

“On my first trip to London many years ago I found myself looking for the nearest Underground station. I noticed a stairway in the sidewalk labeled "Subway," which in my version of English meant subway train, so I confidently descended the stairs and marched forth looking for the trains. After wandering around in various corridors, I found another flight of stairs, leading up, alas, and somewhat dubiously climbed them to find myself on the other side of the intersection from where I had started. I must have missed a turn, I thought, and walked back downstairs to try again. After what seemed to me to be an exhaustive search for hitherto overlooked turnstiles or side entrances, I emerged back on the sidewalk where I had started, feeling somewhat cheated. It finally dawned on me that a subway in London is just a way of crossing the street underground. Searching for the self can be somewhat like that. You enter the brain through the eye, march up the optic nerve, round and round in the cortex, looking behind every neuron, and then, before you know it, you emerge into daylight on the spike of a motor nerve impulse, scratching your head and wondering where the self is.”

We might call this the ‘there-is-nothing-in-the-head-that-corresponds-to-the-self’ problem.

What am I?

The problem turns out to be related to an issue emphasized by Descartes in one of his most powerful arguments for dualism. Descartes asserted that we have immediate phenomenological apprehension of the self as a thinking thing and that the self, so apprehended, is simple and indivisible. He writes,

“When I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clearly one and entire.”

And he argued, if the self is not made of parts, it cannot be made of matter because anything material has parts.
“there is a great difference between a mind and a body, because the body, by its very nature, is something divisible, whereas the mind is plainly indivisible . . . insofar as I am only a thing that thinks, I cannot distinguish any parts in me . . . Although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, nevertheless, were a foot or an arm or any other bodily part amputated, I know that nothing would be taken away from the mind . . .” (1980, p. 97).

The two problems are related. The first suggests that the idea that there is something in the brain-body machine that plays the role of the self as agent of action is belied by a close look through the eyes of the neuroscientist. The second makes explicit why none of what the neuroscientist sees adds up to a self. When we look at the fine-scale material structure of the brain, we find neurons connected in complex networks that regulate the voluntary and involuntary movements of the body, but no thing – no indivisible nugget of self-hood– that receives the signals coming in from the senses and orchestrates the motor activity.

Self-governance

I think that both of these complaints embody a confusion about what kind of thing the self is, considered in its role as agent. The plan in what follows is to begin by looking at other examples of systems that support the vocabulary of agency and allow us to make the distinctions that we want to make between action and mere behavior. The kind of system that I have in mind is one that I call a self-governing system. Self-governance is a type of dynamical organization. We can find actual and idealized examples of self-governance writ large in systems like companies, sports teams, and democratic countries as well, and by looking at these examples, we can get some insight into the question: What kind of thing is this object – the I – that acts when I act, doing what I do? vi What kind of unity does it have? And is it the kind of thing that the neuroscientist should expect to see when he looks at the brain?

Consider different kinds of complex system, starting with the most general category.vii

Simple groups; simple groups are mereological sums of components. Any arbitrary collection of things from the dust particles on a shelf, the set of things whose English names begin with R, or the set that contains the Eiffel Tower, the coins in my pocket and Arnold Schwarzenegger’s big toe, forms a simple group. There is nothing more interesting to say in general about the dynamics of a simple group than there is about the activity of the parts individually. There is not in general a more compact description of the dynamics of the whole than what is obtained by describing the activity of the parts and conjoining them.

Dynamical systems; dynamical systems are systems of components that are worth treating as a dynamical unit because there are constraints on joint behaviour that make for a relatively simple dynamics. They typically consist of a collection of parts bound by mechanical, chemical, or electromagnetic bonds so that there is restriction on their relative motion resulting in a reduction in the number of degrees of freedom relative to what we would get by simple conjunction of dynamics of their constituents.viii Consider, for example, a steam engine. The engine is made of a huge number of particles bound together in a way that constrains their relative motion. The way that we model such systems is usually by building information about the fixed structure of the system into its configuration space using a small number of parameters to specify state-dependent properties. The dynamics is then given as a function over a relatively low-dimensional configuration space. Someone learning how steam engines work doesn’t need to look at the full configuration space for all of the particles that jointly comprise the engine, a space with 6n dimensions, where n is the number of particles the engine contains. She needs only keep track of the relative positions of the moving parts, a space of around 12 dimensions, going by the diagram below.
Self-organizing systems; Self-organizing systems are a special class of dynamical systems. The hallmark of self-organization is the appearance of order in a system of interacting components without any centralized control. There is dispute about whether there is a general dynamical characterization that covers all of the central examples, but central examples include termite colonies, schools of fish, unregulated crowds, traffic systems, and free market economies. In these cases there is no real centralization of information or control, but the actions of each affect the others in a manner that produces an overall appearance of deliberately coordinated activity. Think of how people responding to other people's movements in a crowd can make it seem that a crowd has a mind of its own. A great deal of research has been devoted in the last 30 years or so to understanding mechanisms of self-organization.

Self-governing systems; Self-governance contrasts with self-organization. In a self-organizing system, all behaviour is emergent from the aggregated activity of components, each doing its own thing. The coupling among components can generate the surprising appearance of coordination, but there is not really any pooling of information and centralized control of activity. In a self-governing system, by contrast, there is some centralization of information and some top-down regulation of behaviour. I put this by saying that there is a collectivization of epistemic and practical effort among components. Information distributed throughout the systems is collected and synthesized and used as input to a decision procedure aimed at the collective good, in the precise sense that the utility function that goes into the decision—perhaps computational—is one that defines the good for the system as a whole. Think of the difference between a centrally controlled army and a loosely organized band of rebels operating independently, or the difference between a society without a publicly enforced government and a society regulated by institutions that are designed to give voice to the will of the people through polls and referenda or elected representatives and implements policies that carry out that will. On this view, the government is not a separate system that imposes its will on the people. It is rather the machinery whose purpose is to express and implement the people's collective will. If we were to give a formal rendering of the difference between self-organizing and self-governing system, the crucial difference for our purposes is that in a self-governing system there is both an epistemic standpoint that synthesizes the collective knowledge and a system-wide deliberative standpoint that plays some role guiding the activity of the system in which the collective good appears explicitly as a term in the utility calculation. The deliberative procedure recognizes and weighs claims on behaviour put forward by sub-systems (these can take any number of different forms; in human agents the motley set of drives and appetites cobbled together by nature, in a polis, the desires of individual citizens) and makes an all-things considered judgment about what is best for the system as a whole.

How much collectivization there is on both the practical and epistemic side, and the role that the system-wide viewpoint plays in regulating behaviour, is as varied as the role that the governing board of a company, the government of a country or the commanding structure of an army plays in regulating the behaviour of the whole. Some companies are ruled by an iron hand of a governing board that micromanages every activity. Others treat their parts like semi-autonomous branches that check in periodically for gentle guidance from a company-wide plan.

In the last decade or two, with the explosion of research on complexity, self-organization has figured increasingly in discussions of human behaviour. There was a time when all human behaviour was thought to
be coordinated by a central intelligence. We have come to appreciate that there's a great deal of human
behaviour that is the product of self-organization.20 It is certainly the case, for example, that the beating of
the heart, the activity of the immune system, the focusing of the eyes, and many of the processes associated
with balance and locomotion are the product of self-organization. But not all human behaviour is the result of
self-organization. Some of it is the product of the top-down control of self-governance. The details of how
self-governance is implemented in the brain are not fully understood, but no-one – not even Dennett or
Metzinger, when you look past the analogies with self-organizing systems, and at the details of their
accounts – deny that there is the genuine forging of a collective deliberative standpoint in the human psyche
that can play some role in the determination of behaviour.

What the deliberative standpoint is supposed to do is take appetites and drives (prima facie claims on
behaviour, but which often conflict with one another and overarching plans and projects) as input, weigh
them against one another and larger aims, and (in the light of all that is known about the world and the
system itself) make an all-things-considered judgment about what is best. This all-things-considered
judgment is then adopted as a collective plan. To say this is not to deny that much of our day to day lives is
occupied by practiced routines that are conscious, but non-deliberative, or that there is perhaps less genuine
self-government and more post-hoc rationalized self-organization than we might have thought in our lives.
But I am strongly inclined to say that what makes those activities ours – i.e., what makes it the case that they
are things that we do, rather than things (like the digestion of food or the white blood cells) that our bodies
do - is that they are available to the deliberative standpoint and can be brought under its control.21 And I say
that a self-governing system is constituted as a practical agent in its own right by the activity that
collectivizes deliberation.

Unity

So a self-governing system is a system in which there is an internal reflective standpoint and it is the
possession of that internal reflective standpoint that gives it several different kinds of unity that systems like
gears or ant-colonies don’t possess. The first is what I will call the synthetic unity attained when
information drawn from incommensurate sources is mapped into a common frame of reference. The second is
the univocality attained when a set of separate, potentially conflicting informational streams is united into a
collective voice. The third is the dynamical unity achieved when the parts of a system operate under the
command of a single voice. These three types of unity are linked in interesting ways and I’ll try to bring out
some of the connections.

Synthetic unity

A collection of parts pooling information to form a collective representation about a matter of
common interest, e.g. a set of detectives interviewing different witnesses and investigating different parts of a
crime scene and meeting to iron out a consistent story about what went on, or the crew on a ship taking
measurements from different spots and meeting in the central cabin to combine results to create a fix on the
ship’s location. In these cases, we have separate informational streams with partially overlapping content
being combined into a single overarching representation that can then be put to use, forming policies, or
guiding action. One doesn’t combine informational streams by just having them dump into a common bin.
The information has to be integrated, or rendered commensurate. A uniform descriptive vocabulary and a
common scheme of singular reference have to be provided. In the example of detectives weaving a coherent
narrative out of the partially overlapping testimony of witnesses, personal time lines and spatial movements
are plotted jointly in an objective frame of spatiotemporal reference to identify points of contact. The time at
which one witness was watching the late show is identified with the moment another saw a stranger in the
alley, a bang heard by one is connected to a flash seen by another, a glove reported missing by one witness is
identified with one found later at the scene. Testimony from one witness has to be related to and reconciled
with testimony from other witnesses. As a consistent narrative is constructed, information is added where
narrative holes emerge, trajectories are continued when they pass out of sight; adjustments are made to
resolve conflicting accounts. The integrated story doesn’t report something seen by any one witness. That’s
not its role, it is a reconstructed compilation that identifies points of contact and reveals extensional relations between
them.
The mind faces the same task in integrating information coming in through different pathways. The integration is performed by subpersonal processing that takes in sensory information drawn from different modalities and represented in incommensurate ways and issues a unified conception that allows us to relate the content of different streams to one another, fill in wholes, resolve conflict and so on. Integration holds a number of practical advantages. It allows the senses to share information: we can raise and answer questions about how the object felt relates to the one seen, where the awful smell is coming from, the direction in which to walk to reach the source of the noise, and so on. There are confirmational benefits too; the contents of different streams can reinforce or undermine one another. When we have different sources of overlapping information, we can more easily identify errors, distinguish information from noise, and be more confident in the parts that mutually support one another.

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**Univocity**

Synthesis is a purely information-theoretic notion involving the resolution of multiple informational streams consolidating information distributed across the system into a single coherent stream. It doesn’t matter for those purposes that the resulting stream takes a linguistic form. On a ship, for example, the information might be used to generate a map; the team of detectives might employ a graph or time line to depict the unfolding of the crime. But when a complex system resolves a collection of potentially competing informational streams into a single coherent stream, and that stream has linguistic expression that allows for the explicit self-ascription of intentional states, then a system has what I will call ‘a voice’. What I mean by this is best conveyed by illustration. Consider the way that elections and referenda turn the cacophony of competing individual voices in a population into univocal judgments on matters of public concern. A population is officially polled and the results of polls act in an official capacity as expressions of the collective will of the people. The electoral process gives the community a collective voice. We can speak in a loose and metaphorical way of the voice of the people, but without the electoral machinery that resolves the collection of individual opinions into a collective ‘yes’ or ‘no’, there is no truly collective opinion.\textsuperscript{xv}

Or consider the procedures that turn the opinions of Supreme Court justices into a single collective opinion, expressed in the form of written or spoken pronouncement issued by the collective. An even better example is provided, perhaps by juries. Without collective pronouncements, there is the collection of opinions, but no opinion of the collective. When we say ‘The people have chosen so and so as their new President’, ‘The court has decided that the amendment to the law is unconstitutional’, or the jury proclaims a verdict, the attitudes in question are attributed to the collective. The choices of the people are not mine or yours; they are ours. The opinions of the court do not belong to Sutter or Roberts; they are property of the group.\textsuperscript{xvi} The determination of the jury is not the determination of any individual member of the jury. Collective opinion can, but need not be obtained by applying a simple mathematical function to the opinions of its members. Indeed, in the typical case the process that generates the collective opinion – the back and forth of debate leading up to an election or a ruling - has a complex dynamics involving feedback between the opinion of the individual and the opinion of the group. Individual opinion partly constitutes the opinion of the group, but it is also affected by the way it takes the group to be leaning, so that the two are locked in a relationship of continuous reciprocal influence, making them effectively unpredictable. We see this in the swings of popular opinion leading up to an election and in the way the votes of jury members change in response to straw votes.

When it is given a collective voice, a complex system constitutes an intentional system in its own right. And that status carries with it certain responsibilities. Above all, it carries with it the responsibility to try to meet the demands of rationality, i.e., to try to ensure the consistency of one’s attitudes and their closure under the logical operations. We never entirely satisfy those demands. Persons, juries, and courts often issue inconsistent pronouncements, and none of us is really fully aware of all of the logical implications of our judgments, but there are systems in place to check for inconsistency and incompleteness, and when either is noticed, procedures are undertaken to correct them. More importantly, a system with a collective voice is committed to consistency and therefore can be faulted for inconsistency. We can’t fault Supreme Court justices for disagreeing with one another on a personal level, but when they start self-ascribing judgments in a collective voice, they commit themselves to the consistency of the collective judgments. If they affirm that \(p\), they ought not to affirm that \(\neg p\). If they affirm that \(p\) and \(q\), they are committed to \((p \& q)\), and so on. \textsuperscript{xvii}
The human mind has a collective voice in this sense. It not only integrates sensory information, it explicitly self-ascribes intentional states. Let me say a little bit about why the explicit self-ascription of intentional states is important. It has been frequently remarked that one of the things that distinguishes the human mind from lower animals is that we have language, and language gives us the ability to think about thinking. The idea here is that language is special in giving us a way to represent our representational states. This allows us to make them objects of attention, and this in its turn allows us to view them as a group and raise questions about their second order properties. Are they consistent? Do they cohere? Can we provide reasons for thinking they are true? When we express our representational states in linguistic form and self-ascribe them in "I think" thoughts, we can check them for consistency and logical closure, implement procedures designed to bring them closer to a logically consistent and closed set. This makes the human mind a very special sort of self-regulating representational system. Our ability to think about thinking, to draw inferences, to check for consistency and correct errors, is an expression of a commitment to meet the demands of rationality. Any system that is expressing itself linguistically and self-ascribing intentional states in "I (or we) think that p" sentences is going to share this feature with the human mind.

There is a non-trivial transition from having an internal metacognitive perspective to taking oneself as subject of those attitudes in a manner that recognizes the possibility of other subjects with attitudes different from our own. It has been argued that this transition brings with it new norms that emerge in a specifically social dialectic that involves the exchange of reasons. That transition is one that is certainly made by the time one is communicating and expressing oneself linguistically. The attitudes self-ascribed in the first person in such a setting – "I believe/desire/hope/will that p" – are made in the mind's collective voice, and they belong to the mind as a whole as surely as those self-ascribed by the spokesperson for the Supreme Court belong to the justices as a group, or the verdicts of the jury belong to the collection as a whole. In self-ascribing attitudes, the mind is affirming attitudes whose coherence as a group it also thereby commits itself to. Affirmation is a little different from reporting that such and such is the case. Reporting is a form of description; it carries the implication of a subject matter that obtains independently of its pronouncement. Affirmation (a.k.a. 'avowal') has a performative character; it makes true what it reports by pronouncing it. The people haven't spoken until election results are in, the jury hasn't 'made up its mind' until it has rendered a verdict and the Supreme Court hasn't made a decision until that decision is self-attributed on behalf of the collective by its spokesperson, i.e., until the spokesperson says 'we, the jury, or we the justices of the court, affirm that...'. Performances of this sort are truth bearing (what they say is true) but self-fulfilling (they make it true by saying it). Making up your own mind – judging that p or willing that q – is not a report, it is an avowal. When I judge or will that p, I commit myself to it on a personal level, and to everything that follows from it in conjunction with other personal commitments and all of the norms that that brings in train.

The kind of unity that is possessed by subjects of intentional attitudes – the "I" of "I think that p" - is not given, but achieved, and the suggestion here is that it is achieved by forging a collective voice. I think that this way of understanding things properly captures both the sense in which I – that is, the subject of these self-attributed thoughts and impressions, the thing that thinks when I think and acts when I act – am simple, and the sense in which I am complex. I am complex because I am composed of a collection of subpersonal components, but I speak to the world with a single voice. My voice doesn’t decompose, and the attitudes self-attributed in my personal voice belong to me and not my parts. Voices are not made of voice parts, and the attitudes self-attributed by voices aren’t attributed to any part of the system that produces them. Mereology has become entrenched in philosophy as the right way of talking of the relations between parts and wholes, but it does not give the compositional logic of voices. A community is a collection of people, but a collective voice is not a collection of voices. To what or whom does the voice belong? To the collective. When we have a system that not only integrates informational streams into a unified model of the world, but issues judgments in a collective voice, we have a new non-decomposable unit that can support the attribution of intentional states.

When a system develops an internal point of view and starts making judgments and decisions, the unity that emerges is a real unity, not the as-if unity attributed to the anthill by the curious spectator. The system is constituted as a subject of judgment and volition – i.e., a system that engages in epistemic and practical reasoning and issues judgments and self-commands obeys epistemic and practical norms - by the collectivization of epistemic and deliberative activity. Enforcing the norms means possessing an internal metacognitive awareness, so a self-governing system has a reflective perspective. It represents its intentional
and volitional states, checks them for consistency and coherence, spends time reflecting on its beliefs and values, develops principles for resolving conflict, and you can see the potential here for a hierarchy of self-regarding attitudes, i.e., attitudes to its own intentional and volitional states.\textsuperscript{xxvi} How much of that hierarchy is realized will depend on the system in question. A football team or army might engage in collective deliberation without much reflection on its and other kinds of rudimentary agents don’t spend much time. In human agents the hierarchy of self-regarding attitudes is quite developed. The “I” of a normal human adult is the “I” of the reflective standpoint.

\textbf{Dynamical unity}

The dynamical benefits of synthesis are easy to discern. A system that is pooling information can put the integrated body of information to use to form a coordinated plan of action. A system that has a collective voice can also check its commitments for consistency, articulate goals, and reason instrumentally about how to achieve them, and engage in all kinds of self-regulating behaviour. But there is more. A collective voice turned inward not only affirms, but also commands, feeding back into the lower level organization of the system, it can guide the behaviour of the parts of the system. It is in this capacity that the intentional subject – the “I” of “I think” – serves as a subject of volition, the “I” of “I do…”. This happens in social collectives too. Think of how laws voted in collectively by a population constrain the activity of its members. Or think of a committee that comes together to decide its collective activities and then disbands, leaving each member to carry out its part of the collective plan. As a general phenomenon, a dynamical link from a higher to lower levels of organization is the source of most macroscopic order. There are channels for the propagation of information between levels in all kinds of complex systems, simple causal links that allow the global state of a system to affect its components.\textsuperscript{xxvii} What is really special about intentional agents is that the parts of a complex system under the command of a collective voice act with a singleness of intent and purpose that is impossible for the collection of components acting alone.

A collective voice has an external role too. Given public expression, it can mediate the communication between the parts of a system and other systems at the same level of complexity. When this happens, the systems in question form a network in which each of them is a node. A person is a node in a social network. A corporation is a node in a business network. A nation is a node in an international community. And when we have a system of collectives communicating through public voices we get an emergent dynamics at the intercollective level: special patterns of interaction that are relatively indifferent to the dynamics at the lower level often not predictable from the laws that govern their components. A complex system in a public setting with a voice-piece making public assertions on its behalf has the status of agent, with all of the commitments and entitlements that that status carries in the relevant kind of network.\textsuperscript{xxviii} This goes for governments and corporations as surely as it does for persons. Populations band together into national units with governments acting as voice-pieces, giving rise to a dynamics at the international level. Complex interactions involving feedback and feedforward can make the dynamics at the intercollective level largely autonomous of, and effectively irreducible to, the specific activities of population members. The unified voice of the internal monologue does both of these things; it allows us to operate as unified agents in interaction with other selves – loci in a social network - and it also exercises some control over its components, consolidating resources and allowing a collection of sensorimotor subsystems to make a coordinated effort in pursuit of a common goal.\textsuperscript{xxix}

The overall suggestion, then, is that forging a unified standpoint which collects and organizes information from a number of sources gives rise to a subject whose point of view spans those of the sources, and forging a united voice in which judgments are affirmed and decisions pronounced gives rise to an intentional subject to whom those judgments and decisions belong. The minds of many lower animals consist of a collection of quasi-independent subsystems each with its own sensorimotor loop that responds selectively to a particular class of stimuli and regulates a specific set of behaviours. When these kinds of sensorimotor loop are cobbled together in the right way, the system as a whole can exhibit highly adaptive behaviour, but if there is no integration of sensory information, there is no point of view that spans the sensory modalities, no “I” to which visual, auditory, tactual etc. states can all be ascribed. And if there is no explicit self-ascription of intentional states and attempt to make them as a group into a logically disciplined set, there is no “I” to which those states are properly jointly ascribed. What distinguishes a system like this from the human mind is, among other things, the integration of sensory information. The existence of a perceptual
subject that occupies a point of view that spans the modalities, or spaces, is an artefact of the integration process.

In a self-governing system, there is some one making the choice, some one exercising control, some one making judgments and undertaking commitments. The one here is not an individual substance or material particular lurking inside the system, it is a point of view (or, if you like, is the formal subject of a point of view, the occupant, or the possessor), and it is a kind of formal one-ness that is the product of, rather than a precondition for, the collectivization of epistemic and practical deliberation. This leaves open questions about how effective deliberation is in regulating the system’s behaviour in any given case. Just as we can imagine countries with ineffective governments, we can imagine agents with a deliberative standpoint whose behaviour is in fact governed by whatever drive or appetite has momentary ascendance, Frankfurtian wantons who act without overarching purpose.

**Diachronic unity**

What goes for the proper subject of a collection of synchronic judgments under a unifying standpoint one could also say goes also for the diachronic case. The “I” of “I remember”, like the “I” of “I perceive”, is a point of view that spans a collection of perspectives, and is a formal product of the process that integrates them. This is the job of autobiographical memory which is charged with integrating the snapshot-like contents of episodic memory by providing those memories with a time line and moulding them into a consistent narrative. Locke held such a view. In his words:

“Consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended—should it be to ages past—unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same person, as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment: so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong.”

How can a cognizer that encounters an M at t and then another M at t’ and then another at t’", recognize that there are three M’s? Part of the answer is that he can combine the information in these states in a single further representation, that relates the first M encountered to the second and third. It’s the same capacity that allows him to recognize an N encountered through one modality as the same N as that encountered through another. This process of combining and integrating wherein the questions about the sameness and difference of the things encountered in different perceptual episodes is synthesis. The proper subject of all of these thoughts – the “I” to whom they are all jointly ascribed – is the product of that activity. The nice thing about this view of the unity of the self is that it doesn’t require the recognition of selves as primitive constituents of the universe. Constructing a point of view that spans modalities, or spans temporal perspectives on this sort of view at the same time constitutes a self as occupant of that point of view.

**Echoes of Kant**

I started out exploring the idea that we could find some clues about the identity of the subject by looking not at self-organizing systems, but countries and companies, i.e., collectives organized into self-governing units. Someone else to whom this sort of analogy came naturally was Kant. What Kant says about the self is part of an enormously complex tapestry of ideas, and (acknowledging some exegetical violence) I’m going to do pull out two crucial insights and relate them to what preceded.

The first comes from Kant’s discussion of the synthetic unity of apperception. And the second comes from his account of the formal subject of “I”-thoughts.

**Synthetic unity and the perceptual subject**

First, to the first insight. On Kant’s view, all thought is devoted directly or indirectly to the original function of thinking, whose role it is to (in his words, as they are usually translated) ‘combine and compare’ objects of perceptual experience, and to recognize them under concepts. This process of ’combining and comparing’ is a subpersonal, pre-conscious activity that involves the integration of sensory information.
Experience is the product of this activity and the world presents itself in experience as a spatiotemporally ordered whole. The separation of the sensory state from the object of perception and their relation to one another are both given in the content of the experience. The sensory state is assigned to a material presence in the landscape whose movement is tracked along with the changing landscape. Space and time, as they function in (this part of Kant's discussion are just the forms, or ordering principles of the manifold that results when the sensory fields are integrated. Objects that occupy the manifold have properties that span the modalities. An object seen can also be felt, tasted, smelled. Every sensory event that can be related to a location in that manifold is thereby to every other. The sound of a voice can be related to a location in space and guide one's movements towards its source, and so on. When Kant talks about the synthetic unity of apperception, he is referring to this synthesis that integrates sensory information across the modalities. When he writes the B deduction:

“All representations given to me must stand under this [unity], however they must be brought under it through a synthesis (B 136).”

I think he can be read as signalling both that experience is given to the subject as a synthetically unified whole, and – more important for our purposes – that both the subject and his experience are the product of synthetic activity.

**Judgment: the intentional subject**

Moving to the second insight, most commentators agree that Kant's analysis of the unity of 'I' in “I think” is the most original aspect of his challenge to the Cartesian Cogito. The bulk of that analysis is given not in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, but in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. There Kant characterizes the unity of the 'I', in 'I think,’’ as a 'formal' unity, by which he means that the role is not to refer to a thing whose identity provides the principle of unity for the states assigned to it, but rather to impose standards of rational consistency on those states. Beatrice Longuenesse writes: “In [Kant's] view, 'I' is the term to which we refer our thoughts in order to think of them as unified by one standpoint and bound by rules that commit us to bring about unity and consistency under a rational standpoint.”

This brings him quite close to the suggestion I made that the transformation of beliefs into an inferentially articulated form in which they are explicitly self-ascribed and the implementation of procedures designed to check them for logical consistency and closure, and to make sure they meet the demands of rationality, is at the same time the construction of a rational subject to whom those states can be jointly ascribed.

It sounds very much more mysterious than it needs to in Kant, and I think the analogy with social collectives is genuinely helpful. Consider again the process by which the collection of opinions in a group of jurors is transformed into the collective opinion of the jury. All and only pronouncements in the collective voice are properly ascribed to the jury itself; the back and forth out of which the collective opinion is wrought is all 'sub-juridical'. They belong to the jury members, but not to the jury. Rational constraints apply only to the opinions collected under a single standpoint, to the opinions self-ascribed in the collective voice. A pair of jurors can disagree with one another while remaining personally perfectly consistent, but the opinions of the jury pronounced in the collective voice do have to form a logically consistent set on pain of inconsistency. A pair of Supreme Court justices can hold differing opinions, but the pronouncements of the court make in the collective voice have to form a consistent set. The requirement of consistency is self-imposed by self-regulating procedures we use to examine our commitments at both at the personal and institutional levels, and reinforced by the social and institutional settings in which systems like persons, juries and nations function.

Central here, again, are the two insights (i) that forging a point of view that spans perspectives gives rise to a subject that occupies that point of view, and (ii) that the explicit self-ascription of representational states in an inferentially articulated form and implementation of procedures designed to achieve logical consistency and closure, is a condition of rational cognition. The idea here, again, is that we have an 'I' of “I see/hear/smell/taste …’ as soon as we have a perspective that spans the modality. We have the ‘I’ of “I
think …” once we have the self-regulating procedures in place characteristic of rational cognition. We have the “I” of “I do” in place, once we have the “I” of “I think…” regulating action.

Now we are in a position to see our way around the two puzzles we started with: (i) why we don’t see the self when we look at the brain, and (ii) how anything material can exhibit the kind of unity that Descartes thought he apprehended in himself when he turned his gaze inward. The “I” of “I will/do/decide/affirm/judge” and do such and such”, the one that makes all things considered judgments with an eye to the past and future, in the interests of the human being as a whole is the “I” of the reflective standpoint. It is the product of the distributed activity in the brain, not a neuron or synapse, a collection of neurons or synapses, or a homunculus lurking among them. Not something one should expect to see in a close-up view of the microstructure of the brain, any more than one should expect to see the corporation walking the halls of company headquarters. And we have an interpretation of the simplicity of the self. The agent, on this view, is not a material particular inside the brain, but a point of view (or perhaps the brain-body system unified by the point of view), whose indivisibility is a formal indivisibility, fully compatible with the idea that it is built out of material parts.

Softening the lines

Some qualifications are needed to make the self-governing structure less sharp around the edges. The claim was that when I say I did such and such, in a sense that is explicitly meant to draw attention to the distinction between action and mere behaviour, it is by reference to the role of the deliberative standpoint. But the deliberative standpoint plays a variety of roles in the determination of many different kinds of behaviour. To make the account more general and more recognizable as a model of the human psyche, the dichotomy between action and mere behaviour needs to be replaced by a nuanced understanding of the differences among roles. Eating, breathing, typing, driving or manoeuvring my legs across a tricky terrain, playing basketball, giving a lecture and arguing with a colleague are all things I do, more or less attentively and more or less deliberately. The role that the deliberative perspective plays in these activities is as complex and varied as the role that the governing board of a company plays in managing its day-to-day affairs. And the deliberative process itself need not take the form of an explicitly articulated decision procedure. Even one’s best all-things-considered judgments are often highly intuitive and non-procedural. We have to acknowledge, moreover, that the reflective standpoint itself is a complex and evolving thing with its own internal disunities. How unified it is is a very personal matter that varies across the population and over time in the course of any one person’s history. And the same can be said about how effectively it regulates behaviour. Self-government comes in many different forms from the gentle guidance of a department manager who wants to be called in only for big decisions to the ironhanded control of a dictator who wants every decision to pass through her. However these complexities get sorted out to give an accurate picture of the psychic life of the individual human being (something that moral psychologists have subjected to close and ongoing scrutiny), the self-governing structure, I suggest, provides the setting in which they are to be understood.

Conclusion

I started with the question: what kind of thing is the I that acts when I act, doing what I do? Is it the kind of thing that the neuroscientist should expect to see when he looks at the brain and can it have the kind of unity that Descartes noted when he turned his thought reflexively on himself? I argued that the self-governing structure introduces the agent into the picture without reifying it, giving us a non-question-begging, non-humuncular account of the “I” of “I do (i.e., the proper subject of judgment and volition and the locus of responsibility). If you are looking for something in nature that has the right shape and plays the right role in the determination of behaviour, then you shouldn’t be looking for a concrete particular, or brain pearl lodged somewhere in the human machine. In a being with the kind of psychic organization exemplified by social-governing systems, the reflective standpoint is the thing that judges when I judge, decides when I decide, and is in control of the things that I do.
linguistic form of affirmation? Does the internal voice speak necessarily in a language that also has a public use? These questions are

It takes to acquire the status.

There are other arguments, of course, and those need to be addressed (see, for example, my "Saving the Baby"), but this one is quite interesting, not only because it has some rhetorical force, but because it is instructive to see what is wrong with it.

In linguistic mode: what does the 'T' of "I did x" refer to?

These are rough, heuristic divisions, not intended to be either exclusive or exhaustive.

By 'motion' I mean any variation in relative state.


We know that the collective good is not in general reducible to the good of the components of a system, even under very loose requirements on reducibility. There are special circumstances in which the collective good emerges from the self-interested behavior of components without any deliberate collectivization of practical reason, as in a free-market economy in a Smithian world. But that is the exception rather than the rule.

The will of the people is ill defined until we have an algorithm that tells us how to compute it from aggregated opinion (i.e., until we have a function that defines the collective will as some weighted aggregate of individual opinions).

In evolutionary terms, the collectivization of knowledge prescribes the collectivization of deliberation. In the right kind of environment, for systems with complex enough interests, pooling information will produce more effective action. This does not mean that the more information the collective has at its disposal, the more effectively it can act. When there are processing and attention constraints, a filter that lets only relevant information through might lead to more effective action.


Just as what makes the covert activities of the CIA things that our government does, even if they go on largely outside the public eye and aren’t passed by the legislature.

The collective voice can have both doxastic and volitional aspects. Referenda can determine public opinion, and elections give voice to the public will.

Individual members may share the opinions of the group, just as you and I may share opinions, but the opinion of the group is distinct from the opinion of any one or subset of its members.

I’m staying neutral about just what this ‘commitment to meeting the demands of rationality’ involves whatever norms govern doxastic and practical commitments on the personal level apply on the collective level for a system with a collective voice.

See especially Brandom, _Making it Explicit and Articulating Reasons._

On this account of affirmation, see my ‘Self-knowledge’, and ‘Causation, Perspective, and Agency’.

Or whatever form such pronouncements take.

Not all first-person intentional ascriptions are avowals. To get the right account of self-knowledge, we need a two-tier account along the lines of Petit and McGeer, which allows for both descriptive and performative aspects of self-ascription.

This sort of avowal-based account of self-ascription of mental states has recently come into vogue in discussions of self-knowledge. See Moran, Bar-on, … Those accounts suffer from not distinguishing descriptive cases from cases involving judgment. There is good motivation for a hybrid account. On Kant’s theory of judgment, see Longuenesse. On the distinction between credence and judgment, see Petit and Megyer, ‘the self-regulating mind’. Integration of the informational streams leading from sensory surfaces is something the brain does for us. But it is not just these streams that need to be unified. It’s also the many voices of past selves, each with its own constellation of conative and doxastic commitments; these selves are integrated only by self-conscious discipline and work.

This leaves us with some (tolerable) vagueness. What exactly are the contributors to my voice? The informational streams that it unifies originate in the environment and the distinction between body and environment is soft in ways emphasized in Dennett (Kinds of Mind) and Clark (Being There, Natural Born Cyborgs). We can say the same thing about populations. Who, exactly, is included in the ‘we’ of the people? The informational streams that get resolved into the collective voice are attenuated and there is no obvious terminus. There are the voters, of course, but also the people that voters talk to, and the news media and informal channels through which they get information, and so on. And then there is the question of the collection of parts that are controlled by the government; there are the citizens, of course, the polis, or body politic, but there is a much wider circle of influence affected by more attenuated links and only arbitrary or ‘legislative’ boundaries. All of these sources of vagueness are present, though largely unacknowledged in the case of the self.

We need to expand our vocabulary for the relations between parts and wholes in a manner that makes room for collectives in addition to collections and that interfaces with our criteria for individuating objects. There is no uniform usage here. Do we want to say you have new _objects_ at the higher level? Or new _agents_ but no new _objects_? Or is there some other way of describing these cases?

The ‘self’ in self-regarding indicates the reflexive nature of the regarding relation. These are attitudes that take internal states as their object.

See my ‘Self-Organization and Self-Governance’.

Of course that status can be revoked; entitlements are hostage to fulfillment of commitments. And nothing has been said about what it takes to acquire the status.

One might wonder about the role of language and the social setting. Is the social setting indispensable? And could there be a non-linguistic form of affirmation? Does the internal voice speak necessarily in a language that also has a public use? These questions are

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"Speaking for Ourselves", in _Brainchildren_, p. 39-49.
linked. It may be that affirmation, in the sense in which it figures above, is an activity that can only take place in a social setting. Assertions in a public voice carry cognitive and practical commitments that get their meaning in the social setting, and it may be that this public space is the source of normative notions like truth, accuracy, and warrant.

Can you have a point of view without an occupant of the point of view? When you have the point of view, you get the occupant for free. The transition from ‘there is a point of view whose contents span to “there is a subject whose point of view that is” is an ontologically trivial grammatical transformation. Something of cognitive and practical interest happens when a complex system collectivizes epistemic and practical effort. The transition organizes old materials in a new way, but it doesn’t introduce anything non-material into the world.


Locke, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Chapter XXVII, Of Identity and Diversity. The Lockean view is by far the dominant view among naturalistic philosophers.

There is an interesting question here about whether the indivisibility that Descartes noted when he considered himself as subject of thought extends to the self as temporally extended subject of autobiography. Lockeans allow that persons have temporal parts, though there has been a great deal of dispute about how much divisibility there is along the temporal dimension in a life. See, for example, John Christman. 2004. "Narrative Unity as a Condition of Personhood." Metaphilosophy. 35(5): 695-713, and Galen Strawson "Against Narrativity" and J.


Think of how we integrate visual information obtained from different spatial perspectives by mapping them into a representation of space that’s invariant under transformations between perspectives. In formal terms, synthesis is a generalization of this process. We integrate information obtained through different sensory pathways by mapping them into a common frame of reference, in this case, a conception of the physical world conceived as the common source visual, tactual, etc. experience.

"I think" versus Descartes "I am a thing that thinks", http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2575/longuenesse1.pdf. 16

The unity of self-consciousness is brought about through combination. In constructing representations of objects out of perceptual materials, the understanding also partially constructs a rational subject. It follows that, if perceptions are not such as to permit rational cognition, then it is not just that human beings would not be aware of themselves as continuing cognizers; their states would lack the relations of epistemic dependency characteristic of rational cognizers. They would lack the unity of a cognizer” (“The Unity of Kant’s Active Thinker”, ms., p. 18)

There is a choice we have to make when we detach the ‘self’ from self-governed. It can refer to the whole organized system of components or the deliberative point of view that is the formal subject of intention and volition (the ‘I’ of “I think” and “I do”), and that plays the role of the self in separating action from mere behaviour. The analogous question in these other examples is that of whether the "we" of "We", the jury" refers to the group in terms of its governing function. It is possible to refer to the collective as a subject which has a property that the individual alone lacks. Whether we refer to "we" or "the people" or "we, the jury" makes a difference. See Clark, Andy, "Soft Selves and Ecological Control" and Ismael, The Situated Self.